



VIS INTSUM D10



WEATHER



- D10.1: Day, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D10.2: Day into night, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D11.1: Day, scattered/broken, winds from North-East
- D11.2: Night, scattered, winds from North-East
- D12.1: Day, overcast, rain, winds from North-East
- D12.2: Night, overcast, winds from North-East
- D13.1: Day, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D13.2: Day into night, clear skies, winds from North-East

Explanation:

- Green: Good conditions, VFR, easy to spot targets from all altitudes. No impact on tactics
- Yellow: Can be challenging to spot targets from high altitude due to clouds / low visibility. May have impact on tactics
- Red: Overcast and/or other conditions that make acquiring targets difficult. Will have impact on tactics




SIGNIFICANT EVENTS



Significant events:


- Russian SA-10 unsuccessfully engaged friendly aircraft 1
- Russian SU-24 engaged and killed 2
- 2x Russian SU-34 engaged and killed 3





ENEMY SITUATION (GROUND)









Syrian activity

- Syrian air activity limited to VERY LIKELY CAP.
- Still unknown status of Tabqa airfield. EVEN CHANCE that it has been abandoned or remaining important airfield.







Russian activity

- 1x Russian SU-24 splashed 2
- 2x Russian SU-34 splashed 3
- EVEN CHANCE that splashed SU-34 conducted strike on coalition Patriot site on Cyprus
- VERY LIKELY successful combined Russian/Chinese life firing exercise and maritime landing operation as per VID report.
- Several observations of Tupolev bombers able to carry KH-22/-35 missiles with a range of 50-100NM and KH-65 missiles with a range of 100NM. VID asses HIGHLY LIKELY that missiles will be fired from those ranges if deployed.
- ALMOST CERTAIN that Russia established a base with several aircraft at Basel Al-Assad.
 - LIKELY composition and strength:

12x SU-27

12x SU-34

1x+ IL-76

- TU-22 bombers intercepted North-West of Cyprus. Task of flight unknown, assessment is EVEN CHANCE training or reconaissance/testing coalition forces reaction.





Chinese activity

- ALMOST CERTAIN that China established a base with several aircraft at Beirut.
- LIKELY composition and strength:

12x MiG-29 or equivalent 12x J-11 or equivalent 2x+ H6-J4x+ IL-76(M/D) 1x+ AN-50

- Continued Chinese air activity around Cyprus including possible use of drones LIKELY reconaissance drones used to gather intel about Southern Cyprus airfields (Akrotiri, Larnaca, Kingsfield).
- VERY LIKELY successful combined Chinese/Russian life firing exercise and maritime landing operation as per VID report.
- VID reports H-6J in operation area that are able to carry YJ-88K/YJ-12 anti-ship and KD-20/KD-63 air-to-ground missibles with a range of up to 100 NM. VID asses HIGHLY LIKELY that missiles will be fired from those ranges if deployed.




BDA



- 1x Russian SU-24 splashed
- 2x Russian SU-34 splashed
- 1x MiG-23 from unknown location
- 5x MiG-29 from unknown location

Remaining Syrian aircraft

- 6x AN-26B
- 6x IL-76
- 47x MiG-21
- 7x MiG-23
- 16x MiG-25
- 55x MiG-29
- 17x SU-24
- 6x YAK-40
- TOTAL: 160 aircraft



Colors on map

- GREEN: 67%-100% of total squadrons strength
- ORANGE: 34%-66% of total squadrons strength
- RED: 0%-33% of total squadrons strength



ENEMY SITUATION (IADS)



Important Events during D9: Sector East:

- 1 Russian SA-10 unsuccessfully engaged friendly aircraft on D9.2 [D9.2-12]
 - VIS recommends friendly aircraft do not come within 40nm of Bassel Al-Assad
 - Critical area is the sea west of the airbase, the mountain range to the west hinders LOS, allowing low-level flight
- ② DE Search Radar reported at Taftanaz AB, implying Air defences in the area [D9.1-5]
- 3 SA-11 confirmed stationed IVO Tartus [D9.1-38]





ENEMY SITUATION (IADS)




Important Events during D9: Sector West:

- 1SA-11 IVO Kharab Ishk fully disabled, 1x SD Search Radar remains [D9.2-2]
 - VIS assesses Kharab Ishk is now HIGHLY LIKELY free of MERAD and LIKELY free of SHORAD
- 2 SA-11 reported SSW of Tabqa [[D9.2-20]
 - Probability of this site having been relocated from Tal Siman currently unknown
- 3 SA-3 and SA-15 confirmed at Palmyra AB, SA-2 still guesswork


Important Events during D9: Sector South:

NSTR














RESPONSIBLE: VIS












Ships 1.1, 1.2 & 1.4	Ropucha	BINGO BULGO SERVICE SE
Ship 1.3	Moskva	BINGO LIST
Ship 4.1	Possible Rezky	













RESPONSIBLE: VIS








































ENEMY MOST LIKELY COA



<u>AIR</u>

MOST LIKELY COA

- Coalition forces VERY LIKELY splashed two aircraft involved in attack on coalition Patriot site on Cyprus.
- HIGHLY LIKELY more limited short term retaliation strike(s) against coalition forces, VERY LIKELY aircraft or ground assets due splashed Russian aircraft by coalition forces. EVEN CHANCE that those retaliation strikes will be more severe than the previous strike on the Patriot missile site.

SEA (No change since VIS INTSUM D9) MOST LIKELY COA


- · Russian and Chinese forces conduct exercise as planned.
- Russian/Chinese ships conducts port visit in Syria or Lebanon

IADS

MOST LIKELY COA

- VIS assesses most likely COA that enemy IADS forces will continue to support enemy air assets with "SAM corridors" for safe passage and will try to deny coalition forces freedom of movement in IADS sector east.
- Relocation of IADS sector south units into sector east (or west) is possible, VIS assumes higher likelihood that new SAM units being deployed from SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) will form the majority of reinforcements to sector east

Ground forces (no change since VID INTSUM D9)







ENEMY MOST DANGEORUS COA



<u>AIR</u>

MOST DANGEROUS COA

- Still HIGHLY UNLIKELY Russian anti-ship strike against coalition carrier group as retaliation for splashed Russian airplanes as this would mean a severe escalation between Russian and coalition forces.
- However, if this strike against the coalition carrier group would be a pre-planned course of action, VIS assesses EVEN CHANCE for such a strike.

SEA (no change since VID INTSUM D9) MOST DANGEROUS COA


- Russian/Chinese ships conduct a amphibious assault on Lebanon
- · Russian/Chinese ships threatens our own carrier

IADS

MOST DANGEROUS COA

- VIS assesses most dangerous COA to be a large-scale effort by the enemy to reinforce their ground forces within ~50nm of the FLOT with MERAD and LORAD systems.
- Relocation of IADS sector south units into sector east (or west) is possible, VIS assumes higher likelihood that new SAM units being deployed from SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) will form the majority of reinforcements to sector east

Ground forces (no change since VID INTSUM D9)





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TARGETING



VIS AIR

- VIS recommends increased CAP flights over coalition forces to minimize risk of expected Russian retaliation strike(s).
- VIS HIGHLY recommends constant CAP activity far west of carrier group because of continued Tupolev sightings there. Those bombers can carry long range missiles that are launched from at least 100NM.
- VIS HIGHLY recommends constant CAP activity between Chinese H-6J bombers operating from Beirut and carrier group. Those bombers can as well carry long range missiles that are launched from at least 100NM.
- VIS HIGHLY recommends establishing a clear and structured procedure for pilots to take appropriate steps IF an attack by Russian or Chinese aircraft is expected, like:
 - Intercept at 150 NM from carrier group
 - · VID and determine if bombers actually carry missiles.
 - If yes, take increasingly escalating action like issuing warning calls, take warning shots.
 - If bombers continue to approach the carrier to less than 100+X NM, consider shooting them down.
- VIS recommends increased CAP flights at southern coast of Cyprus due continued intense Chinese activitiy south and around Cyprus.

VIS IADS

- VIS recommends SEAD/DEAD efforts shift from Kharab Ishk to Tabqa (and Tal Siman if SAM threat still present) to form a
 permissive environment in the northern half of ADF Sector East in preparation of PHASE 2. (VIS assessed priority B)
- VIS recommends strike on SYTGT022 (Raqqa vehicle factory) before D12 to inhibit SA-2 production (VIS assessed priority C).
 6x SA-2 launcher expected at SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) after D12. (VID INTSUM D8 2.3.2). SEAD/DEAD on Tabqa strongly recommended to allow for strike. (RAZOR 7 AAR D9.1)
- In preperation for PHASE 2, VIS requests flights be tasked with gathering intel on possible SAMs between the FLOT and Tabqa (Aleppo, Kuweires, Tal Siman, Taftanaz). Suitable for secondary tasking.



7 ANNEX

7.1 Annex 1: Target priorities

Priority A

- The target is essential for mission success in support of current objectives (or is a designated a Time Sensitive Target (TST).
- · It is crucial to the overall success of the operation.
- It will have immediate and compelling effects.
- Its timeliness as an urgent target may not exist in the future.
- If not targeted, negative consequences may seriously jeopardize future CJTF operations

Priority B:

- Targets have substantial, but not immediate impact on the battle.
- The cascading effects this target provides may not be realized in the future.
- If not targeted on this ATO, a significant level of effort may be required later.
- If not targeted, negative consequences may significantly hamper CJTF operations.

Priority C:

- It will contribute to the battle, but it is not critical to mission success.
- · It will further the success of the operation.
- It will eventually require targeting due to JFC future plans.
- If not targeted on this ATO, negative consequences will probably not impede
 operations.

Priority D:

- · Target of opportunity if:
 - A) Other targets not suitable for this ATO.
 - o B) As a backup target
- It will have minor contributions to the operation.
- It may be required for targeting but is not time critical.
- If not targeted, no negative consequences





NEW INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS



Intelligence Requirement / Information gap	Nominated by	Latest time of value	Justification
Are there any SAMs located at Kuweires	VIS IADS	Start of phase 2	In order to support LCCs plan, VIS want to ensure there is no SAMs present and Kuweires that can hamper operations against A-G flights in the area
Are there any SAMs located at Aleppo	VIS IADS	Start of phase 2	In order to support LCCs plan, VIS want to ensure there is no SAMs present and Kuweires that can hamper operations against A-G flights in the area
What is the status at Tabqa airfield? - Number and type of remaining aircraft? - State of runway and repair efforts?	VIS AIR	ASAP	In order to assess if Tabqa is beeing completely abandoned, VIS need further information to get a good status on the airfield
Are SCC East moved to Tiyas airbase?	VIS AIR	ASAP	VIS need confirmation on where SCC East have been moved to
Are SCC East moved to Palmyra airbase?	VIS AIR	ASAP	VIS need confirmation on where SCC East have been moved to
Determine number and type of aircraft at Tiyas?	VIS AIR	ASAP	VIS need to confirm the strength of Syrian air assets, including reinforcements from Russia
Determine number and type of aircraft at Palmyra?	VIS AIR	ASAP	VIS need to confirm the strength of Syrian air assets, including reinforcements from Russia
Determine number and type of aircraft at Bassel Al-Assad airbase?	VIS AIR	ASAP	In order to determine strenght and compisition of Russian forces.
Determine number and type of aircraft at Beirut airport?	VIS AIR	ASAP	In order to determine strenght and compisition of Russian and/or Chinese forces.
Determine number and type of aircraft at Rayak airbase?	VIS AIR	ASAP	In order to determine strenght and compisition of Chinese forces.

No change since VIS INTSUM D9

